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Abstract
The purpose of this research was to explore experts’ memory capacity and the strategies experts use to achieve that capacity. Expert air traffic
controllers were asked to recall traffic information during two radar and two nonradar scenarios. During radar scenarios, air traffic information
was communicated aurally and displayed visually. During nonradar scenarios, air traffic information was communicated aurally only. Qualitative
recall data assessment revealed an average capacity of five to eight aircraft in radar scenarios and three to six in nonradar scenarios, with two to
three details recalled for most recalled aircraft. Recalled details and order of detail recall were highly consistent across experts, which suggest that
aircraft details were organized and stored within larger conceptual knowledge structures. Recall patterns were additionally suggestive of frames
containing slots designated for holding specific data types, structures described by Klein’s Data/Frame Model of Sensemaking. The extent of
information recalled and its organization are additionally consistent with the use of long term working memory to extend working memory
capacity; however, they do not rule out the use of working memory alone. Differences between radar and nonradar conditions were observed.
Greater overall recall and greater and earlier recall of certain data-tag elements were observed in radar scenarios. In nonradar scenarios, greater and
earlier recall of assigned actions were observed. Evaluation of experts’ descriptions of their recall processes suggested primarily visuospatial
information encoding in both conditions and a lack of support for differences in the use of visuospatial or verbal encoding.
Keywords: explore long-term working memory, air traffic control, working memory, working memory capacity
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Working memory refers to the conceptual storage area
where information is held while being actively processed.
One of the most actively pursued working memory research
topics has been the issue of working memory capacity –
how much information can be held in working memory at
one time? This question becomes especially interesting
when targeted at experts—how much information can be
actively held and used in working memory by experts
working in their domain of expertise?
Working memory capacity can be characterized in two
fundamental ways—in terms of a pure capacity limit and as
a capacity for meaningful, integrated stimuli, the latter of
which may be impossible to pin down precisely (e.g.
Cowan, 2000). In a highly influential 1956 paper, Miller
reviewed absolute judgment experiments and concluded
that working memory has a pure capacity limit of seven
plus or minus two chunks of information. Miller characterized chunks as related bits of information that become
integrated in memory. According to Miller, chunking
consists of ‘‘organizing bits of information into familiar
units… since memory span is a fixed number of chunks; we
can increase the number of bits of information that it
contains simply by building larger and larger chunks, each
one containing more information than before’’ (p. 91).
Miller suggested that humans use this chunking strategy to
increase the amount of information that can be held active
and processed at one time.
Subsequent research has demonstrated that chunking can
be a very powerful memory aid. Chase and Simon’s (1973)
study of chess players is one of the earliest and best known
demonstrations of the increase in working memory capacity
made possible by chunking. They compared the chess game
recall of a master, mid-level, and novice chess players’
memory for meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli—for
chess pieces in game-play and unrealistic chessboard
configurations, respectively. Participants performed two
tasks that Chase and Simon referred to as a perception and
a memory task. In each trial of the perception task, the
master, mid-level, and novice chess player replicated a
chessboard configuration while glancing at the source board
as infrequently as possible. In memory task trials, players
viewed the chessboard for five seconds and then attempted
to replicate from memory the configuration of pieces on the
left half of the board. The results indicated that more chess
pieces were correctly placed by masters (M 5 16 pieces)
than by mid-level (M 5 8 pieces) or novice (M 5 4 pieces)
players for mid-game configurations. In the perception task,
Chase and Simon identified chunks of recalled chess pieces
by noting each glance at the original chessboard and each
pause of more than two seconds between the placement of
two chess pieces. They found that the expert’s average chunk
size for game-play configurations (M 5 7.7 pieces per
chunk) but not for unrealistic configurations was larger than
average chunk size in the low experience groups (M 5 5.5
and 5.7 pieces per chunk).
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More recently, Cowan (2000) has suggested that Miller’s
1956 estimate of pure working memory capacity is inflated.
Cowan’s review of working memory capacity research,
he claims, supports a pure (i.e., without benefits from
rehearsal or existing knowledge structures) storage capacity
of three to five chunks. Chen and Cowan (2009) have since
refined this estimate to three chunks based on a study in
which participants are asked to recall words from lists of
different lengths presented under conditions of articulatory
suppression (repeating ‘‘the’’) and following training that
focused on gaining familiarity with certain single and
paired words. Research by Gobet and his colleagues (Gobet
& Clarkson, 2004; Gobet & Simon, 1996) suggests the
number may also be lower than Miller’s estimate for
information benefitting from existing knowledge structures.
Pointing to the results of their computer-based replication
of Chase and Simon’s (1973) study, Gobet and Simon
(1996) argue that working memory capacity is closer to
three or even two chunks. The two researchers used their
replication of Chase and Simon’s work to compare two
theories: their own multiple templates theory, according to
which chunks can continue to develop into more complex
knowledge structures—templates—that contain slots where
chunks can be inserted, and Miller’s chunking theory,
described above. Their results indicated that the findings of
Chase and Simon were affected by the physical limit on the
number of chess pieces that could be held in a participant’s
hand at one time. This artificial limit may have resulted
in an underestimate of chunk size. Gobet and Simon
concluded that their findings support template theory; chess
players tended to recall two to three interconnected sets, or
templates, each containing up to 15 chess pieces. The trend
has thus been toward characterizing working memory
capacity as small in terms of the number of items—that is,
of chunks or templates—and quite large in terms of the
amount of information held within each item, particularly
in experts.
A related body of theory and research suggests that
working memory capacity may get an additional boost
from long term memory. The concept of a long-term
working memory (LTWM) was first introduced by Ericsson
and Kintsch (1995) to explain evidence suggestive of an
expanded capacity in working memory that allows people,
especially experts, to process and work with a great deal
more information than should be possible. They suggest
that this unexpectedly large amount of actively held
information may reflect the use of long-term memory to
keep relevant information readily available to working
memory. Ericsson and Kintsch argue that with sufficient
experience in a given domain, knowledge structures that
support performance in that domain form and develop in
long term memory. The knowledge structures support rapid
information retrieval; retrieval so rapid that information
seems to be held continuously in working memory when it
is actually shuttling back and forth between working and
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long term memory. Information that is active in working
memory will trigger a retrieval cue and retrieval structure,
activating the interconnected knowledge such that it is
readily available for use in working memory. A review of
expert and expertise acquisition neuroimaging research by
Guida, Gobet, Tardieu, and Nicolas (2012) produced support
for both LTWM and template theories of memory and the
role they attribute to existing long term memory knowledge
structures in extending working memory capacity. In that
review, Guida et al. report finding consistent evidence across
studies of brain region activation patterns in novice learning
and expert performance that were indicative of experts’ use
of long term memory in working memory tasks.
Sohn and Doane (2004) studied the role of long-term
working memory in complex cognitive task performance.
Specifically, they looked at instructor versus student pilots’
performance on a working memory task and a long term
working memory task that used cockpit snapshots as stimuli,
and correlated the data with performance on a situation
awareness task. They found that experts’ long-term working
memory scores, but not their working memory scores, were
higher than novices’. In addition, performance on the
situation awareness task was more correlated with long term
working memory than with working memory task performance. The results support the notion that a domain-specific
development of long-term working memory can overcome
differences in working memory capacity.
Research Goals
The present research was designed to explore experts’
memory. In particular, our goals were to gain insight into
how much detail about a given information-rich situation
experts are capable of recalling and what strategies and
organizational patterns support that recall capability. The
domain of expertise chosen for this study is air traffic
control, an information-intensive work domain with high
memory demands. Air traffic control experts participated in
both a typical high demand radar scenario and an equally
demanding nonradar scenario in which the controller relies
solely on radio-transmitted information to monitor and
manage traffic (a rare situation but one for which
controllers prepare). Recall data were assessed with the
goals of obtaining and examining:

N evidence relevant to the use of long-term working
memory to supplement working memory capacity,

N evidence relevant to the use of storage structures such
as chunks and templates,

N data characterizing the nature of storage structures that
may have been used, and

N evidence suggestive of the use of different memory
strategies or organizational patterns when information
is visual and auditory (radar condition) versus only
auditory (nonradar condition).

Three experienced air traffic control instructors participated in this qualitative study. Experts are frequently studied
in small numbers. For example, the influential Chase and
Simon (1973) study described above featured only a single
expert and Gobet and Simon (1996) had three, four, and six
participants in each of the three experience groups they
compared. The goal of these studies is not to use data to test a
hypothesis about two or more experimental conditions,
which requires a large sample size. Rather, the goal is to
explore data from a small number of specialized participants
deeply and comprehensively in order to gain insight into an
improved understanding of expertise.
Method
Participants
Three male retired air traffic controllers between the ages
of 60 and 69 with 23 to 34 years of experience controlling
high levels of air traffic in a radar environment volunteered
for this experiment. Specific demographic data are not
provided to ensure participant anonymity. Each participant
took part in four 28-minute air traffic control scenarios.
Experimental Design
The experiment was a two-level within subjects design.
The independent variable was control mode (radar vs
nonradar). In each control mode condition, the participant
performed two scenarios matched for difficulty. Difficulty
was not determined by the number of aircraft but by the
complexity of control decisions within a scenario. Nonradar
control is considered more difficult than radar control by
most controllers, and the simulator scenarios difficulty
assessment algorithm takes this into account. Each scenario
featured three recall trials, two embedded and one at the
end of each scenario, for a total of six recall trials in each
control mode condition.
Facility
The experiment was conducted in the En Route Air Traffic
Control Lab at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in
Daytona Beach, Florida. The Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) has certified these labs as official training labs. Students
completing their degrees in Air Traffic Management use these
labs daily. The R-side (Radar side) position is composed of
two 20-inch computer monitors, a communications panel (on
the right side of the desktop of each position; see Figure 1), a
QWERTY data entry keyboard resembling keyboards used in
FAA Air Route Traffic Control Centers, a trackball mouse, a
headset with microphone, a push-to-talk foot pedal, and a
handheld push-to-talk key. The monitors are vertically stacked
in a custom-built cabinet, with the top monitor containing all
meteorological information, flow control information, and
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Procedure

Figure 1. Each en route air traffic control simulation system is composed
of two positions, a radar side (R-side) on the left and a data side (D-side)
on the right. Participants in this study worked in the R-side position.
During the nonradar condition, they were supported by an assistant in the
D-side position.

active Military Operations Areas (MOAs), while the bottom
monitor consists of the radar scope. Two flight progress strip
bays sit to the right of the R-side position.
Confederates
In each scenario, a pseudo pilot sat at a pseudo pilot
workstation on the opposite side of the lab from the
participant and behind a divider. The pseudo pilot voiced
communications for the pilots of all simulated aircraft in the
scenario and controlled the aircraft by inputting all aircraft
instructions given to pilots by the expert controllers.
Pseudo pilot communication to controller was scripted; it
appeared in a prompt box when the pseudo pilot clicked on
each aircraft. The pseudo pilot was instructed to give no
additional information before, during, or after the testing.
The pseudo pilots were student laboratory assistants paid
by the Air Traffic Control Department at ERAU who had
completed the nonradar class. A single pseudo pilot
supported all participants across all four scenarios. The
pseudo pilot workstation includes a 20-inch computer
monitor, a standard Dell keyboard, and a pair of headset/
microphone headphones. A foot pedal and hand-activated
control for push-to-talk communication activated communication.
In the Radar condition, a data controller (known as the
D-Side controller) sat to the right of the participant. His
purpose was to sequence flight strips according to arrival
time for the Radar controller. This D-side role is standard in
everyday air traffic control operations and they did not
support the participant in any other way. This confederate
controller had the same equipment as the primary
controller.

The participants were instructed to direct traffic as they
normally would. They were informed that each situation
was going to be paused twice and that at each pause and at
the scenario’s end they were to recall the current traffic
situation and the characteristics of each flight quickly.
Participants were told that each time the scenario pauses or
ends, the display would go blank, a blank airspace map
would be placed on the desktop in front of them, and they
should immediately begin writing recalled aircraft and
aircraft details on the map. The following recall instructions
were read to each volunteer: ‘‘In no particular order, please
recall the current traffic situation including items such
as aircraft identification, speed, altitude, direction of
flight, hand-offs pending or completed, point-outs, arrivals,
departures, and any conflicts’’. Each recall trial had a time
limit of four minutes.
After being familiarized with the experiment’s procedure, the participants were given a set of flight progress
strips and instructed to begin when ready. Each scenario
was paused for a recall trial at two times, each time
randomly selected from within the windows of 8–12 and
16–20 minutes into the scenario. Two video cameras,
focused on the air traffic control radar display and desktop,
were used to record each recall trial.
A method used to assist experts in verbalizing cognitive
work is the verbal retrospective think-aloud protocol. At
the end of each participant’s final scenario, the participant
was asked to verbally walk-through (recount) his most
recent recall trial and to describe the ‘‘how’’ and ‘‘why’’ of
the recall process to the extent able. The response was
videotaped.
Data Analysis
Traffic Situation Recall
Videotaped recall sessions were examined and the
recalled details were transcribed and compared with the
corresponding traffic situation. The number and types of
aircraft details recalled and patterns in recall were assessed
and compared across the radar and nonradar conditions.
Retrospective Think-Aloud Data
Retrospective think-aloud data were transcribed and coded
(categorized) to characterize responses as implicating the use
of either visuospatial or verbal encoding of information.
Every data extract in each transcript was assessed by two
independent coders to determine whether it referred to the
processing or recall of visuospatial information, verbal
information or neither and each was coded accordingly.
Through a discussion of conflicting codes, code reconciliation was achieved using Cohen’s kappa.

24

R. L. Triplett, J. M. Jaworski, and K. J. Neville / Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering

Results
Tables 1 and 2 show the number of aircraft correctly
recalled by condition and expert across all six recall trials.
The tables show that more aircraft tended to be recalled in
the radar than nonradar condition. Because recall trial times
were randomly chosen across the two scenarios of each
condition, the number of aircraft in the airspace varied
(from 2 to 11) across trials.
Aircraft recall order was assessed across recall trials,
control mode conditions, and experts. In many trials, the
participant first recalled the aircraft he had communicated
with most recently; however, communications transcripts
were not available to allow the exploration of the potential
pattern. No other patterns in aircraft recall order were
noted.
Tables 3 and 4 show the percentages of recalled aircraft
for which each of four aircraft characteristics were correctly
recalled. Included in these tables are the data tag elements
speed and altitude, but no other data tag elements (such as
point of origin, destination, aircraft type, or heading)
because experts never recalled them.
Aircraft call signs were always reported during recall
trials, but all three experts reported obtaining call sign by
looking up at the flight progress strip of each aircraft after
first recalling it by position. They also reported it to be the
hardest to remember of the characteristics recalled. Expert 3
sheds light on this during the think-aloud session when he
stated, ‘‘You don’t have to rely on memory for that. It is
either A, on your strip or B, on your strip and on the
display, so I usually don’t try to retain the call sign.’’
Although the use of the flight progress strip could be
viewed as compromising the results of this testing, this
researcher views it as informative regarding the relationships between memory contents and environmental cues.
Column 4 in Tables 3 and 4 shows the percent of times
an assigned action was recalled. If an aircraft was not
performing a controller-assigned action at the time of
recall, there was no assigned action to recall; however, the
percentages in the assigned action column are for all
aircraft, not just those that had an assigned action and so are
artificially low. (Communications data were not recorded
and so aircraft with assigned actions could not be
identified.) Consistent with the frequent recall of assigned
action, Expert 1, in his think-aloud session, identified
assigned action (‘‘what the aircraft were doing’’) as the
Table 1
Average number and percent of aircraft recalled across the six recall trials
in the radar condition.
Expert
Expert 1
Expert 2
Expert 3

Mean Recalled (SD)

Percent Recalled

7.33 (1.97)
6.50 (1.87)
5.80 (1.47)

83%
91%
71%

Note. The number of aircraft in the airspace varied across recall trials.

Table 2
Average number and percent of aircraft recalled across the six recall trials
in the nonradar condition.
Expert
Expert 1
Expert 2
Expert 3

Mean Recalled (SD)

Percent Recalled

5.33 (2.25)
4.50 (1.52)
3.50 (0.83)

72%
69%
60%

Note. The number of aircraft in the airspace varied across recall trials.

easiest information to recall, noting that it is the crux of the
job. Assigned action is also central to understanding and
remembering the air traffic situation according to the thinkaloud description given by Expert 3: ‘‘to remember the traffic
situation [I usually] remember line-of-flight. I put myself in
the pilot’s seat. When I issue a clearance, as I am issuing it I
am flying it… To know the aircraft’s point in space, speed,
altitude, and whether it is climbing or descending, is what is
important to me.’’
Static vs. Dynamic Information
Aircraft characteristics were independently categorized by
three researchers into two categories: static and dynamic.
Characteristics were characterized as static if they never
changed, such as call sign, origin, destination, and type of
aircraft. Dynamic characteristics either changed regularly or
reflected the development of an aircraft’s status or position.
They include characteristics such as altitude, speed, hand-off
status, point-out highlighting, and departure/arrival status.
As shown in Tables 2 and 3, in both control mode conditions
experts only recalled dynamic characteristics.
Organization of Recall
Figures 2 and 3 show the order in which each of the
three experts tended to recall aircraft position, call sign,
data tag contents, and assigned action. Data tag information
recalled was altitude, speed, or both. For the present
analysis, the two attributes were grouped together. The
percentages shown between each set of nodes in the two
figures represent the frequency with which, for each of the
three experts, call sign was recalled after position, the
frequency with which data tag elements were recalled after
call sign when call sign was recalled after position, and so
forth.
Recall order tended to follow two dominant patterns.
Table 5 shows the frequencies with which the two
dominant recall orders occurred in each control mode
condition. The columns labeled with the code P-.CS-.DT
show the percentage of recalled aircraft for which
information was recalled in the position (P), call sign
(CS), and data tag (DT) succession. Columns labeled with
the code P-.CS-.A show the percentage of recalled
aircraft for which information was recalled in the position,
call sign, and action information succession.
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Table 3
Percent of aircraft characteristics recalled across the six recall trials in the radar condition.

Expert 1
Expert 2
Expert 3

Location

Data Tag: Altitude

Data Tag: Speed

Assigned Action

100%
100%
88%

100%
100%
78%

27%
0%
15%

59%
48%
58%

As seen in Table 5, data tag information tended to be
recalled earlier and more reliably in the Radar condition
whereas assigned action was recalled earlier and more
reliably in the Non-Radar condition.
Modality Comparison: Recall of Visual-Spatial vs.
Verbal Information
As can be seen by comparing the data in Tables 1
through 5, experts tended to recall more visual information
(position and altitude) in the Radar condition and more
auditory information (assigned action) in the Nonradar
condition. Retrospective think-aloud data were assessed to
determine if the two conditions also differed with respect to
the format in which information was encoded. Think-aloud
data were divided into excerpts that were coded to
characterize responses as indicative of the use of a visualspatial or verbal code. The analysis of inter-coder reliability
conducted on the pre-reconciled codes produced a Cohen’s
kappa coefficient of .65, which is considered a fair to good
level of agreement (Banerjee, Capozzoli, McSweeney, &
Sinha, 1999). Table 6 presents the percent of data extracts
in each condition to suggest each type of encoding.
The results of the categorization of think-aloud data
extracts demonstrate that in the radar condition, information tended to be encoded and processed in a visuospatial
form. The picture is less clear for the nonradar condition.
Notably, our expectation that information would be
encoded and processed primarily using a verbal code was
not borne out.
Conclusions
In Gobet and Clarkson’s (2004) research, experts’ ability
to recall recent moves as well as ‘‘attack’’ (action) moves
were greater than recall for other moves. This tendency for
the recall of relevant information supportive of task goals
held true in the current study; the experts were able to recall
aircraft information that pertained to the movement,
separation, and action of aircraft within the airspace. As

seen in Tables 2 and 3, recall for these elements was high
across both control conditions. In general, dynamic aircraft
information tended to be recalled, whereas static information did not.
The data patterns for the recall of aircraft and aircraft
characteristics shed light on experts’ strategies, which they
have adapted through years of training and experience. The
recall patterns found here are consistent with the notion that
templates are used to support the storage and retrieval of
potentially large quantities of information. More specifically, all data were recalled on an aircraft-by-aircraft basis;
that is, information seemed to be recalled as a series of
cohesive streams of information about specific aircraft.
This quote from the think-aloud data of Expert 3 is
consistent with the recall of an integrated set of information: ‘‘I didn’t really recreate the airspace; I recreated the
traffic situation, the approximate position of the aircraft
and, in particular, their line of flight or their projected
position.’’ This description, combined with observed
recall patterns, suggests that the experts’ memory storage
structures might take the form of aircraft-centered chunks
organized within one large template that represents the
active portions of the airspace. This conceptualization of a
single airspace template is consistent with Cohen (2000)
and Gobet and Simon’s (1996) re-characterization of
chunks as templates and their conclusion that working
memory can hold three to five and two to three templates,
respectively, of unlimited size.
The organization of the data is also compatible with
Klein, Phillips, Rall, and Peluso’s (2006) Data-Frame
Theory of Sensemaking. In the terminology of that theory,
the aircraft-related information elements are assigned to
preexisting slots in each aircraft-centered frame, and each
aircraft frame might be used to fill slots in an airspacebased frame. According to this theory, the recall patterns
suggest a frame (a representation of the airspace) containing an average of six smaller frames (representing
individual aircraft), each of which contains four slots (for
position, call sign, data tag information, and assigned
action).

Table 4
Percent of aircraft characteristics recalled across the six recall trials in the nonradar condition.
Expert
Expert 1
Expert 2
Expert 3

Location

Data Tag: Altitude

Data Tag: Speed

Assigned Action

100%
100%
100%

88%
74%
95%

0%
0%
0%

78%
52%
100%
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Table 5
The percent of aircraft data recalled in each of the two dominant orders.
Radar Condition
Expert
Expert 1
Expert 2
Expert 3

Nonradar Condition

PRCSRDT

PRCSRA

PRCSRDT

PRCSRA

94%
58%
57%

0%
30%
40%

41%
26%
14%

66%
66%
86%

Note. The code P-CS-DT represents the recall order position-call sign-data
tag. The code P-CS-A represents the recall order position-call sign-action.

Figure 2. Recall order in the Radar Control Mode condition. Each set of
values indicates the percent of aircraft recalled by Experts 1, 2, and 3,
respectively, from top to bottom of each stack of values. Moving
clockwise from top, the values indicate the percent of aircraft for which
position then call sign were recalled; for which position, then call sign,
then data tag information, then assigned action were recalled; and for
which position, then call sign, then assigned action were recalled.

Observation of the recall process suggested that each
recalled aircraft characteristic primed the next item for
recall and therefore each recalled item served as a key or

trigger for the next recalled item. The sequential triggering
of elements for recall is consistent with Ericsson and
Kintsch’s (1995) theory of long-term working memory and
its proposition that expert performers rely on knowledge in
long-term memory and a system of retrieval cues to expand
working memory capacity. According to their theory,
memory structures, i.e. the templates or frames holding the
expert’s knowledge of the airspace, are held in long- term
memory, not working memory. Their contents are selectively activated and brought into working memory—
perhaps one aircraft at a time or even one aircraft
characteristic at a time. Data to support this notion of
priming are limited to the consistent order in which
information types were recalled and observation of
participants’ body language and patterns in pauses and
verbalizations. Observed pauses in recall suggested that
experts were actively pulling information into working
memory, one set at a time, versus holding multiple sets in
working memory from where they might tend to be
reported as a single cohesive stream of information.
Implications

Figure 3. Recall order in the Nonradar Control Mode condition. Each set
of values indicates the percent of aircraft recalled by Experts 1, 2, and 3,
respectively, from top to bottom of each stack of values. Moving
clockwise from top, the values indicate the percent of aircraft for which
position then call sign were recalled; for which position, then call sign,
then data tag information, then assigned action were recalled; and for
which position, then call sign, then assigned action were recalled.

Patterns found in this research may have implications for
training strategies useful to controllers in training with the
FAA in building better knowledge templates and in starting
to build those templates earlier. Educational material could
be presented in ways that directly map to or otherwise
support the development of meaningful template-based
knowledge structures that may aid students in both learning
and remembering greater amounts of information.
Additional implications may be found for the Next
Generation of air traffic control technologies (NextGen),
being developed to, among other things, increase the
aircraft tracking capability and capacity of air traffic
controllers. This means more aircraft on a display, more
tracking, and more decision-making. One issue being
considered is reducing the amount of information displayed
in the alphanumeric data tag to avoid visual overload. The
patterns found in this research suggest that very few
information items are actually used to control air traffic.
Location, identification, speed, and altitude are the essential
pieces of information that participants recalled in the
current investigation. Potentially, these are the core pieces
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Table 6
Percent of think-aloud protocol data extracts suggesting the use of verbal versus visual-spatial encoding.
Radar Condition
Expert
Expert 1
Expert 2
Expert 3

Non-Radar Condition

VisuoSpatial Format

Verbal Format

VisuoSpatial Format

Verbal Format

83% (10)
75% (3)
82% (9)

17% (2)
25% (1)
18% (2)

44% (4)
60% (3)
81% (13)

56% (5)
40% (2)
19% (3)

Note. Only data extracts referring to the verbal or the visuospatial nature of information were extracted from the think-aloud data. Parenthesized numbers
represent the total number of categorized extracts in each condition and information format.

of information that should be included in a minimized data
tag.
This research also has implications for personnel
selection. The Air Traffic – Selection and Training Exam
(AT-SAT) is the standardized test that all air traffic control
applicants who have received a Tentative Offer (of
employment) Letter (TOL) must complete with a score of
70% or greater to continue to be eligible for employment.
Applicants that pass this test are divided into three
categories: 70.0 to 84.9 is qualified, scores of 85.0 and
above are classified as ‘‘well qualified.’’ A third category
that has yet to be defined or assigned is ‘‘most qualified’’.
The AT-SAT test consists of eight sections and takes seven
hours to complete. One segment features a recall test called
‘‘Letter Factory.’’ In this test, participants are asked to
maintain four factory conveyer belts of varying speed. At
the end of each belt is a box to be filled. The boxes are
different colors as are the letters displayed on the conveyer
belts. The purpose is to fill each box with the letters A, B,
C, and D of the corresponding color. Other letters are
presented on the belts, but the participant must click a
quality control button off to the side of the screen when
these unwanted letters are presented. Each conveyer belt
has a quality control line that indicates the point at which
the letters must be placed before they are discarded and
unusable. Additionally, at random times throughout the
hour-long session, the screen will go blank and a question
about the current situation will appear. Questions ask which
conveyer belt had the most letters on it, which box was
most full, and which belt was moving the fastest.
The results from the present investigation, combined
with the findings of Sohn and Doane (2003) discussed
earlier, suggest that the letter factory test should be adapted
to include information that is relevant to the work domain;
in this case, air traffic control. Presenting scenarios such as
those used in the current research and pausing each
scenario to raise scenario-based questions would increase
the sensitivity of the test for assessing the potential to
become an effective air traffic controller, which is
influenced by pre-existing knowledge, i.e., knowledge in
long-term working memory.
In conclusion, the data patterns produced by this work
suggest implications for the future of air traffic control

and our understanding of expertise and expert memory
capacity. The light shed on experts’ recall capabilities and
patterns has implications for the training of novice
controllers, radar displays, NextGen technologies, and
suggestions for the AT-SAT examination of all potential
air traffic controllers. The results also shed light on the
knowledge organization strategies experts use and the
amount of information they can actively maintain.
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